| | If
language and the brain are co-evolved and language as a latecomer can avail itself
of pre-existing means to solve its own problems, then it should be possible to
describe it in terms of processing strategies and constraints arising from brain
systems. This is precisely what this study attempts to do with respect to the
emergence of three types of higher-level meanings: direct speech acts, built-in
conditions for their success and non-defetive performance and constraints on sequencing
of an argumentational kind. In so doing, there are three main issues it needs
to address. What types of problem arise at the text level that could have led
to the emergence in question? Is there a clear parallel between these problems
and those faced by brain systems? What solutions have been evolved to cater for
the latter, which coul have been co-opted by language? Finally, there is the question
of the extent to which such an account is compatible with a globaltheory of brain
function such as Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection. |
